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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INDIAN LAW:
THE ONGOING DIVESTITURE BY THE SUPREME COURT
OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS,
ON AND OFF THE RESERVATION
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)*
I. FACTS
Floyd Hicks (Hicks) was a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone
Tribes of Nevada (Tribe) and resided on the Tribes' reservation, which was
established by the federal government in 1908.1 In 1990, state game
wardens suspected Hicks had killed, off the reservation and in violation of
Nevada law, a California bighorn sheep, which is a protected species.2 On
August 30, 1990, Michael Spencer, a state game warden, sought a search
warrant to investigate the allegations against Hicks.3 A warrant was issued,
subject to tribal court approval, because the state court held that the state
did not have jurisdiction over the matter.4 After obtaining approval from
the tribal judge, Spencer and a tribal police officer searched Hicks's
premises and took into possession one mounted bighorn sheep head.5 The
sheep head turned out to be from an unprotected species and was later
returned to Hicks.6
One year later, a tribal police officer informed the game warden that
two bighorn sheep heads were mounted in Hicks's home. 7 Spencer then
sought another search warrant to search Hicks's home and again obtained
approval from the tribal court. 8 Assisting in the second search were
* Winner of a North Dakota State Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Comment Award.
1. Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks 111), 533 U.S. 353, 355-56 (2001). The reservation consists of
approximately 8000 acres and was established by federal statute, Act of 1908, ch. 53, 35 Stat. 85.
Id.
2. Id. at 356. The offense is considered a gross misdemeanor under NEV. REV. STAT. §
501.376 (1995). Id.
3. Id.; see also Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks 11), 196 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 1999).
4. Hicks 111, 533 U.S. at 356.
5. Id.
6. Hicks I1, 196 F.3d at 1022. The sheep head was that of a Rocky Mountain bighorn, which
is a species not protected by statute. NEV. REV. STAT. § 501.376. Under the statute, a valid tag is
required to kill or possess pronghom antelope, certain bighorn sheep, black bears, elk, deer,
mountain goats, and mountain lions. Id.
7. Hicks III, 533 U.S. at 356.
8. Id. The second warrant did not specify that tribal court approval had to be obtained;
rather, the measure was taken as a safeguard. Id.
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additional state game wardens, as well as tribal police officers. 9 During the
second search, one or more sheep heads were taken into possession and
again they were determined to be from an unprotected species.10
Hicks filed suit against several defendants in tribal court claiming that
his sheep heads had been damaged and that the second search went beyond
the scope of the warrant.1t Specifically, Hicks's claims included abuse of
process, unreasonable search and seizure, trespass to chattels and land,
denial of equal protection, and denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.12 Hicks brought suit against the tribal judge, the state game wardens
in both their official and individual capacities, the tribal officers, and the
State of Nevada.13 Hicks's claims against several of the defendants were
dismissed, leaving the state game wardens in their individual capacities as
defendants. 14
The tribal court held, and the Tribal Court of Appeals affirmed, that the
Tribe had jurisdiction to entertain Hicks's claims.15 In return, the State and
the game wardens sought declaratory judgment from the federal district
court claiming that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction.16 The district court
granted Hicks summary judgment on the jurisdictional issue and held that
all claims of qualified immunity17 brought by the state officials would have
to be exhausted in tribal court. 18 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding, stating that the tribal court had jurisdiction over Hicks's
claims because he resided on tribe-owned land within the boundaries of the
Tribes' reservation. 19 The state game wardens and the State of Nevada
9. Id.
10. Hicks 11, 196 F.3d at 1123.
11. Hicks Il1, 533 U.S. at 356.
12. Id. at 356-57. Under § 1983, a person acting under color of law can be held liable for
infringing on another's constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). In addition, the statute
provides injured individuals with a remedy for the deprivation of those rights. Id.
13. Hicks 11I, 533 U.S. at 356.
14. Id. Hicks's claims against the tribal judge and the tribal officers were dismissed by
directed verdict. Id. Subsequently, Hicks dismissed his claims against the State of Nevada and
the state game wardens in their official capacities. Id. at 357.
15. Id. at 357.
16. Id.
17. Public officials, in carrying out discretionary functions, can claim protection from civil
liability, as long as their actions do not infringe upon an individual's statutory or constitutional
rights. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 753 (7th ed. 1999).
18. Hicks 111, 533 U.S. at 356; see also Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks 1), 944 F. Supp. 1455 (D.
Nev. 1996).
19. Hicks 11, 533 U.S. at 357; see also Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks 11), 196 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court granted
certiorari. 20
The issues brought before the Court included whether a tribal court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought against state officials for their
alleged tortious conduct on tribe-owned land and whether it has jurisdiction
to adjudicate § 1983 claims.2' The Court held that tribal courts do not have
jurisdiction to entertain claims regarding state officials' conduct in exe-
cuting process because it is not crucial to tribal self-government or admini-
stration of internal control. 22 In addition, the Court concluded that because
tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction they cannot adjudicate §
1983 claims.23
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. TRIBAL JURISDICTION BEFORE THE COURT'S MONUMENTAL
DECISION IN MONTANA V. UNITED STATES (1981)
Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, in
what has become known as the Marshall Trilogy, 24 set the backdrop for
how courts and legislatures have dealt with Federal Indian law and the issue
of tribal jurisdiction.25 Out of these cases came the precedent that Indians
did not have the right to own land, only the right to occupy it,26 and that
reservations were "domestic dependent nations," not foreign states.27
However, in the last case of his trilogy, Chief Justice Marshall and the
20. Hicks 11, 196 F.3d 1020, cert. granted, 531 U.S. 923 (2000).
21. Hicks II, 533 U.S. at 356. The Court also entertained the issue of whether the defen-
dants were required to exhaust all of their claims in tribal court before taking them to federal
court. Id. at 369. The Court held that "tribal exhaustion" was not necessary because the tribal
court lacked jurisdiction, and it "would serve no purpose other than delay." Id.
22. Id. at 364.
23. Id. at 366.
24. The Marshall Trilogy consists of three cases, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515
(1832), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S.
(I Wheat) 543 (1823), which were decided by the United States Supreme Court while John
Marshall was Chief Justice. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's
Pursuit of States' Rights, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 269 & n.6 (2001).
25. See generally Worcester, 31 U.S. 515; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1; Johnson, 21 U.S.
543.
26. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592.
27. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. The Court held that tribes constituted "domestic
dependent nations... [in that] [t]heir relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian." Id.
2002]
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Court held for the first time that state laws had no effect inside reservation
borders.28
Over a century later, Justice Marshall's ideas were still causing a stir in
cases such as Williams v. Lee. 29 In Williams, Lee, a non-Indian, owned a
store within the Navajo Indian Reservation and attempted in the state court
system to collect on a debt owed to him by a Navajo Indian and his wife.30
Williams, the debtor, sought to dismiss the claims on the grounds that the
state court lacked jurisdiction over the matter and that it should be tried in
tribal court.31 The United States Supreme Court held that when an Indian is
a party to an action, the tribal court will have exclusive jurisdiction. 32 The
Court stated that to allow otherwise, "would undermine the authority of the
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right
of Indians to govern themselves." 33
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided in Fisher v. District Court of the
Sixteenth Judicial District of Montana34 the issue of whether a state court
had jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding involving only tribal mem-
bers.35 The Court held that regardless of whether the litigation involves a
nonmember or only tribal members, the state's jurisdiction depends on
whether the state action hinders tribes from creating and being governed by
their own laws.36 According to the Court, the state's involvement in an
adoption proceeding concerning only tribal members would obviously
interfere with the tribe's ability to govern itself and would subject tribal
members to an inconvenient forum.37 The Court concluded that "[s]ince
the adoption proceeding is appropriately characterized as litigation arising
28. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561. The Court held that the Cherokee Nation was a distinct entity
and that nonmembers could not enter upon the reservation unless they had the consent of the tribe
or were granted such right under treaty or statute. Id.
29. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
30. Williams, 358 U.S. at 217-18.
31. Id. at 218.
32. Id. at 220. This was subject to whether Congress had enacted legislation stating
otherwise. Id. At that time, Congress had rarely provided states with any authority to regulate
Indians on reservations. Id. However, Congress had granted the federal courts jurisdiction over
certain crimes committed by Indians against other Indians or persons, including murder, incest,
manslaughter, robbery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, assault, and maiming. 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2000).
33. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
34. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
35. Fisher, 424 U.S. at 383. In Fisher, a mother lost custody of her son due to neglect. Id.
The tribal court awarded custody to a third party, who later sought to adopt the child in state court.
Id. The mother moved to dismiss the claim, stating that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the
matter. Id. at 383-84.
36. Id. at 386.
37. Id. at 387-88. According to the bylaws and constitution of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe,
the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over all adoptions involving tribal members. Id.
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on the Indian reservation, the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is
exclusive." 38
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,39 which was decided in 1978,
the Court debated the validity of a law passed by the Suquamish Tribe that
provided the tribal court with criminal jurisdiction over certain offenses
committed by nonmembers, as well as members. 40 The issue of whether
tribal courts could exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers was one
of first impression before the Court.41 In making its decision, the Court
looked to past congressional action, as well as case law of other jurisdic-
tions, and found that "the commonly shared presumption of Congress, the
Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal courts do not have
the power to try non-Indians carries considerable weight." 42 The Court
stated that by becoming incorporated within the United States, tribes relin-
quish the right to try non-Indians, except as provided for by Congress. 4 3
The Court held that tribes lack authority and jurisdiction to prosecute
nonmembers in the absence of a congressional delegation providing
otherwise. 44
That same year, the Court held in United States v. Wheeler45 that tribes
still retain many aspects of sovereignty, not only over their members but
also over tribal territory. 46 This includes the rights of tribes to create and
38. Id. at 389. The Court stated that the tribe's exclusive jurisdiction is not based on race,
rather it is based on the "quasi-sovereign" nature of the tribe as provided for under federal law.
Id. at 390.
39. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
40. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. This case involved two separate petitioners, both of whom
were non-Indian residents of the reservation and were arrested for committing crimes on the
reservation. Id. Oliphant was arrested for assaulting a tribal police officer, while Belgarde was
arrested for reckless endangerment and damaging property. Id. At the time, the Suquamish Tribe
was one of twelve tribes that passed a law extending tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in the
criminal context, and its court was one of thirty-three tribal courts that attempted to enforce such
jurisdiction. Id. at 196.
41. Id. at 197.
42. Id. at 206.
43. Id. at 210. The idea that tribes are precluded from exercising certain powers because of
their incorporation into the United States is not new to the Court. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (1 Wheat) 543, 574 (1823). In 1823, the Court held that tribes are restrained from exercising
authority that would conflict with interests of the United States because the tribes are no longer
truly sovereign. Id. The Court has also held that since tribes are located within the boundaries of
the United States, their interests are subordinate not only to the federal government, but to the
states as well. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211; see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379
(1886).
44. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
45. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
46. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. Wheeler, a member of the Navajo Tribe, was arrested on the
reservation and charged under the laws of the tribe with disorderly conduct and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. Id. at 314-15. Stemming from the same incident, Wheeler was later
charged with the statutory rape of a female tribal member under federal law. Id. at 315-16.
2002]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:125
enforce laws for their members, as well as to punish them for breaking
those laws.47 However, this does not include the power of tribes to prose-
cute nonmembers for crimes in tribal court, to transfer land that tribes
occupy to nonmembers, or to enter into certain types of relationships with
foreign entities.48
Wheeler raised the novel issue of whether a tribal member could be
charged under both federal law and tribal law for offenses stemming from
the same incident.49 The Court held that when a tribe punishes one of its
members for an offense, it is not as an "arm of the Federal Government,"
but as its own sovereign. 50 Because the tribe and the federal government
are considered separate entities, a prosecution under the laws of one does
not constitute the same offense under the laws of the other; therefore,
double jeopardy is inapplicable as a defense.5l
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reser-
vation,52 the Court considered whether a state could impose taxes on certain
transactions which occur within a reservation. 53 In Confederated Tribes,
the State of Washington sought to apply taxes to cigarette and other tobacco
products being sold on the reservation.5 4 The tribes were already collecting
their own taxes on the cigarette sales, which the Court found constituted a
significant interest to the tribes. 55 However, the Court held that the state
also had an interest in taxation and the revenue it would provide. 56
47. Id. at 322, 326. The Court held that even though tribes and their reservations fall within
the territory of the United States and are afforded some protections by the United States, tribes
still retain a certain level of sovereignty. Id. at 323.
48. Id. at 326. The Court held that "[t]hese limitations rest on the fact that the dependent
status of Indian tribes... is ... inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their
external relations." Id.
49. Id. at 314. The respondent claimed that this constituted double jeopardy under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. Double jeopardy is when an individual is prosecuted more than once for the
same or similar crime. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (7th ed. 1999).
50. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329.
51. Id. at 329-30. The Court found that tribal courts are usually limited in the amount of
fines and the length of jail sentences they can impose; therefore, defendants will usually receive a
mild punishment from tribal courts. Id. at 330; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). The federal
government retains jurisdiction over several major crimes committed on reservations, including
manslaughter, murder, incest, and arson. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2000). Individuals found guilty of such crimes will receive a more severe punishment in federal
courts than in tribal courts. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330.
52. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
53. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 139.
54. Id. The State, in addition to imposing taxes, was confiscating untaxed cigarettes en route
to the reservation. Id.
55. Id. at 152. The Court stated that it has been recognized that "tribes possess a broad
measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in
which the tribes have a significant interest." id.
56. Id. at 157.
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The Court stated, "[i]t can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian
Commerce Clause57... bars all state taxation of matters significantly
touching the political and economic interests of the Tribes." 58 Therefore,
the Court concluded that a state tax on certain items within the reservation
would not be burdensome and would not impede on the tribe's right to
create laws and be governed by them.59 The Court's holding in Confede-
rated Tribes came less than a year before its paramount holding in Montana
v. United States.60
B. THE MONTANA RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS:
How IT HAS CHANGED TRIBAL JURISDICTION
Chief Justice Marshall stated in Worcester v. Georgia6' that a state's
laws have no effect inside reservation borders.62 Over the next century, the
Supreme Court moved away from this idea and began to chip away at tribal
sovereignty by allowing more state regulation of tribal matters. 63 The
Court also stripped the tribes of any sovereignty over relations with
nonmembers. 64
In Montana v. United States, the Crow Tribe sought to regulate hunting
and fishing by nonmembers on land located within the reservation, but not
owned by the tribe. 65 The Court decided that tribes can regulate fishing and
57. The Indian Commerce Clause is found in the United States Constitution and provides for
the regulation of commerce by the federal government of Native American tribes. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The clause, according to the Court in Confederated Tribes, is aimed at
"preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on, Indian Commerce." Confederated
Tribes, 447 U.S. at 157.
58. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 157.
59. Id. at 156-57. The Court also held that it would not be burdensome for the State to
require tribes to place tax stamps on their cigarettes before sale and to keep records of sales on
taxable and nontaxable items. Id. at 159.
60. 450 U.S. 544(1981).
61. 31 U.S. (I Pet.) 515 (1832).
62. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
63. See Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 156-57.
64. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1981) (citing United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)). The Court held that tribes retain sovereignty over tribal territory and
tribal members; however, the dependent status of the tribes divests them of the authority to
regulate matters outside of the reservation. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
65. Montana, 450 U.S. at 548-50. The Crow Tribal Council, believing that the Tribe had
been granted control over the Big Horn River by treaty with the United States, passed laws to
restrict hunting and fishing on the Reservation by nonmembers. Id. at 548-49. However, the
State of Montana was also asserting jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by nonmembers. Id.
This prompted questions at trial and on appeal whether the Big Horn River was owned by the tribe
or by the State of Montana. Id. at 549-50. The Supreme Court held that it belonged to the state
by virtue of title granted by the United States upon Montana becoming part of Union. Id. at 551.
After title has been granted, the land is governed by state law unless Congress conveys the land
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hunting by nonmembers on land owned by the tribe or held in trust for it, as
well as stipulate nonmember entry onto the land.66 However, tribes cannot
regulate fishing and hunting by nonmembers on land held in fee simple 67 by
nonmembers. 68 The Court stated that to determine whether there is tribal
jurisdiction, the general rule is that the "exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express congressional delegation." 69
However, the Court did not completely dismiss the possibility that the
tribes could exert jurisdiction over nonmembers under certain circumstanc-
es and, by doing so, carved out two exceptions to the general rule. 70 First,
the Court held that when nonmembers enter into consensual relationships 71
with a tribe or its members, the tribe retains the right to regulate such
activity.72 Under the second exception, the Court found that tribes may
regulate nonmember activity on tribe-owned land within the reservation if
such activity would threaten the economic security, political integrity, or
the health and well-being of the tribe and its members. 73
After its decision in Montana, the Court took a different standpoint in
National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe7 4 regarding the extent of
tribal civil jurisdiction. 75 In National Farmers, the Court considered
whether the Crow Tribal Court had jurisdiction to entertain a tort action
which had originated on state-owned land within the reservation. 76 The
Court held that "the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, [and] the extent to
"in order to perform international obligations." Id. (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48
(1894)).
66. Id. at 557.
67. Fee simple is an interest in property or land that remains with the holder of the interest
until the holder dies without an heir to take the interest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 630-31 (7th
ed. 1999). Fee simple is "the broadest property interest allowed by law." Id.
68. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
69. Id. at 564. The Court held that regulating hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land
not owned by the tribe was not necessary to preserve self-government or control domestic affairs.
Id. at 630.
70. Id. at 565.
71. Consensual relationships can include leases, contracts, or other dealings. Id.
72. Id. The Court held that such regulation may occur through "taxation, licensing, or other
means." Id.
73. Id. at 566.
74. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
75. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 849.
76. Id. at 850-53. In National Farmers, a member of the Crow Tribe was hit by a
motorcycle in the parking lot of the school he attended, which was located on state-owned land
within the reservation. Id. at 847. A suit to recover damages was brought against the school
district in tribal court. Id.
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which that sovereignty has been altered, divested or diminished." 77 Stat-
utes, as well as case law, administrative law, and treaties must be examined
to determine whether a tribal court has been divested of its sovereignty to
hear a particular case. 78 In addition, the Court found that when a tribal
court's jurisdiction is brought into question, the tribal court has the right to
first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before a case can
be removed to another court.80
In Iowa Mutual Insurance v. LaPlante,81 the Court again looked at the
rule regarding the right of a tribal court to determine its own jurisdiction,
which is also known as tribal exhaustion. 82 The Court held that as a matter
of comity,83 federal courts should abstain from granting removal of cases
involving tribal members until the tribal court has had an opportunity to
decide whether it has jurisdiction.8 4 In addition, the Court concluded that
tribal courts should retain civil jurisdiction over nonmember activity that
occurs on the reservation, unless the tribal court is divested of that right by
federal statute or treaty. 85
77. Id. at 855-56.
78. Id.
80. Id. at 856-57. The Court held that allowing the tribal court to determine its own
jurisdiction would promote Congress' "policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-
determination." Id. at 856. It would also aid in the development of a complete record prior to
addressing the merits of the case, as well as a proper remedy, and it would allow the tribal court to
cure any errors it had made. Id. at 856-57.
81. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
82. Iowa Mut. Ins., 480 U.S. at 15-16. In this case, an employee of the Wellman Ranch
Company, which was located on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, was injured in a car accident.
Id. at 11. The employee filed a claim against two insurance companies in tribal court to recover
damages for his injuries. Id. The insurance companies argued that the tribal court lacked juris-
diction and sought to have the case removed to federal court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. Id. at 12-13.
83. Comity is the courtesy a political entity gives to another entity when recognizing the
other's laws, judicial decisions, etc. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261-62 (7th ed. 1999).
84. Iowa Mut. Ins., 480 U.S. at 15-16. Tribal exhaustion requires the exhaustion of all
possible remedies in tribal court before removing the case to another court. Id. It also provides a
tribal court with the opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction over a claim and to address any
challenges to its jurisdiction. Id. The Court created the tribal exhaustion rule to "encourag[e]
tribal self-government" and to promote a tribe's authority over its own affairs. Id. In addition, the
Court held that a tribal court is better suited to determine issues of tribal law, and this rule helps to
preserve that end. Id. at 16.
85. Id. at 18.
2002]
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In 1989, the Court decided Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation,86 which dealt with the zoning of land owned
in fee simple by nonmembers, but located within the Yakima Reservation. 87
The Court had to determine which entity, Yakima County or the Yakima
Nation, had the authority to zone such lands.88 The Court held that tribes
do not have the authority to zone lands held in fee by nonmembers that are
open to the general public, when there is no threat to the tribe's security,
integrity, or health and well-being. 89 The Court stated that where a threat to
the tribe does exist, that threat "must be demonstrably serious" and the tribe
must have a "protectible interest in what is occurring on adjoining proper-
ty" in order to justify the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in
similar situations.90
A decade later, Strate v. A-i Contractors9' was decided.92 In Strate,
the Court sought to clarify its holdings in National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual because tribes were misinterpreting the holdings as granting them
authority over nonmembers.93 The Court held that the rules set out in those
cases did not overturn or expand upon its holding in Montana; rather, they
did nothing more than set out a doctrine of tribal exhaustion as a matter of
prudence and comity.94 The Court reiterated that neither case granted tribal
courts adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers.95
86. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
87. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 414. The Yakima Nation had passed zoning ordinances, which
encompassed tribal land, as well as land that belonged to nonmembers. Id. at 416. The County of
Yakima had also passed zoning ordinances that encompassed some of the same land, although
lands held in trust for the tribe were excluded. Id. After two individuals, Brendale and Wilkin-
son, sought to alter their property and applied to the county for approval, the Yakima Nation
brought suit contesting the alterations and the county's zoning authority. Id. at 418-19.
88. Id. at 414-15.
89. Id. at 430-3 1.
90. Id.
91. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
92. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
93. Id. at 453; see generally Iowa Mut. Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers
Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). In Strate, the tribe and the United States focused
on the Court's wording in Iowa Mutual, which stated that regarding nonmember activity on the
reservation, "[c]ivil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute." Strate, 520 U.S. at 451
(quoting Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18). The Court found that the tribe had misinterpreted the
phrase, and when taken in context, the phrase did not limit the rule set out in Montana. Id. at 452-
53.
94. Strate, 520 U.S. at 452-53.
95. Id. at 448.
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In Strate, the Court also held that the tribal court did not have civil
jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim that arose out of an accident that occurred
on a state highway which ran through the reservation. 96 The Court adhered
to its ruling in Montana that tribes generally lack civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers on land not owned by the tribe, absent congressional dele-
gation specifying otherwise.97 In addition, the Court held that "[a]s to non-
members ... a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed [a tribe's]
legislative jurisdiction... [a]bsent congressional direction enlarging tribal-
court jurisdiction." 98
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,99 the Court again addressed
whether a tribe has the power to tax nonmembers on nontribal land.lOO The
Court held that the Navajo Nation could not tax nonmembers on land held
in fee by nonmembers based on its holding in Montana and because Con-
gress had not delegated such power to the tribe by treaty or statute. 10 The
Court reiterated that "Indian tribes are 'unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,' but
their dependent status generally precludes extension of tribal civil authority
beyond these limits."1 02
For over a century, the Court maintained a trend of minimizing tribal
sovereignty, first by taking away tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
members, and then by taking away tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember
activity on land not owned by the tribe, but within the reservations.103 By
the time the Court had decided Atkinson, the tribes were virtually powerless
96. Id. at 442. An accident between two nonmembers occurred on a North Dakota highway
located on trust land and running through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. Id. at 442-43.
Gisela Fredericks, one of the individuals involved in the accident, was seriously injured and
remained hospitalized for approximately twenty-four days. Id. She filed suit in tribal court
against the driver of the other vehicle and against the driver's employer to recover damages. Id.
at 443. Fredericks' five children, who were tribal members, also filed suit in tribal court against
the same parties claiming loss of consortium. Id. at 443-44.
97. Id. at 446. This is subject to the two exceptions set out in Montana, which are the
consensual relationship exception and the threat to the tribe's well-being, security, and integrity
exception. Id.
98. Id. at 453.
99. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
100. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 647-49. Here, the Navajo Nation tried to place an eight percent
tax on hotel rooms located within its borders. Id. at 647-48. The guests of the hotel would pay
the tax, while the hotel owners would collect the tax and give it to the tribe. Id. at 648.
101. Id. at 654. The tribe tried arguing that its taxation fell under either of the Montana
exceptions; however, the Court held that the tribe "failed to establish that the hotel occupancy tax
[was] commensurately related to any consensual relationship with petitioner or [was] necessary to
vindicate the Navajo Nation's political integrity." Id. at 658-59.
102. Id. at 659 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
103. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978); see also Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
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to regulate any matters that went beyond reservation borders and tribal
members. 04
III. ANALYSIS
Hicks III was decided by a nine-to-zero vote. 105 Justice Scalia wrote
the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.l0 6 The Court held that the Fallone
Paiute-Shoshone Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction over the state game
wardens' actions, nor did it have jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.107 Justice
Souter wrote a concurring opinion, which Justices Kennedy and Thomas
joined.108 Justice Souter agreed that the tribal court did not have juris-
diction to adjudicate Hicks's claims; however, he stated that he would have
adhered strictly to the Montana rule, rather than focusing on state interests
as the Court did.109 Justice Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion.ll 0 In
her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg stated that the Court's holding applied
only to tribal jurisdiction over state officials, but it left open the question of
whether a tribe could exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers in general.III
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurrence in part and in judgment, which
was joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer.ll 2 In her concurrence, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the rule set forth in Montana does not necessarily
prohibit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal land just because
those nonmembers happen to be state officials. 113 Justice O'Connor
concurred in the judgment, but she stated that she would have reversed on
the state officials' immunity claims. 1 4 Justice Stevens filed his own
opinion concurring in judgment, which was also joined by Justice
Breyer. 115 Justice Stevens stated that, absent congressional action pro-
viding otherwise, the question of whether tribal courts are courts of general
104. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 658-59.
105. Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks II1), 533 U.S. 353, 354 (2001).
106. Id. at 355.
107. Id. at 364-68.
108. Id. at 375 (Souter, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 375-76.
110. Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 387 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 401. According to the Court's opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurrence appeared
to be more of a dissent because not only did she disagree with the opinion in regard to the scope
of tribal jurisdiction, she also disagreed about whether a tribal court has authority to adjudicate §
1983 claims. Id. at 370-74.
114. Id. at 401.
115. Id. at 401-02 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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jurisdiction should be a matter left to the tribal courts.1 16 He argued there-
fore that tribal courts should not be denied the right to adjudicate § 1983
claims.l' 7
A. THE OPINION OF THE COURT
The Court focused on two primary issues: (1) whether the tribal court
had jurisdiction over the state game wardens' alleged tortious conduct on
tribe-owned land, and (2) whether it had jurisdiction to entertain 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims." 8
1. The Tribal Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction over the State
Game Wardens'Alleged Tortious Conduct on Tribe-Owned
Land
When examining whether the Tribe could adjudicate a matter involving
a nonmember, the Court first had to consider whether the Tribe could
regulate the matte. 19 The Court referred to Montana when trying to decide
the extent of the tribe's regulatory authority. 20 In Montana, the Court held
that when nonmembers are involved, the tribe cannot exercise its power
"beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations... without express congressional delegation."121 An ex-
ception to this rule is when nonmembers consensually enter into relation-
ships, such as contracts, with the tribe or tribal members. 22 Although the
game wardens consensually obtained a tribal warrant, the Court held that
the "consensual relationship" exception was not applicable because
obtaining a warrant did not constitute an "other arrangement," as articulated
116. Id. at 402-04.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 357. The issue of tribal exhaustion was raised on appeal; however, because the
Court found that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction over the matter, addressing tribal
exhaustion was unnecessary and "would serve no purpose other than delay." Id. at 369.
119. Id. The Court had to inquire whether the Tribe "either as an exercise of their inherent
sovereignty, or under grant of federal authority-[could] regulate state wardens executing a search
warrant for evidence of an off-reservation crime." Id. at 358. If the Tribe had authority to
regulate the state game wardens' actions, the tribal court would have jurisdiction over disputes
arising from those actions. Id. at 358 n.2.
120. Id. at 358.
121. Id. at 359. Montana is viewed as one of the primary cases on the matter of tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers. Id. at 349; see generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981). In Montana, the Court held that the Crow Tribe could not regulate the activities of
nonmembers on land not tribally-owned. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566-67.
122. Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks 11), 533 U.S. 353, 359 n.3 (2001).
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in Montana.123 The Court went on to state that when taken in context,
"other arrangement" refers to a "private consensual relationship," which
was not apparent here. 124
The Court looked at ownership status of the land where the state game
wardens' conduct took place when deciding whether tribal regulation over
their conduct was "necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations." 25 The Court held that ownership status of land is not
conclusive in regard to the issue of jurisdiction, rather it is only a factor to
be considered when deciding whether a tribe can regulate nonmember
conduct. 126 The Court went on to state that tribal ownership of land by
itself cannot confer upon a tribe regulatory authority over nonmembers.1 27
The Court examined prior case law to determine what actually con-
stitutes those things that are "necessary to protect tribal self-government or
to control internal relations."1 28 It found, in Montana v. United States, that
appropriate exercises of tribal authority include the power to regulate rules
of inheritance, tribal membership, punishment of members for offenses, and
domestic relations. 29 Because tribes have "the right ... to make their own
laws and be ruled by them," tribal regulation of nonmembers must be
connected to that right.130 However, this right does not preclude the state
from ever exercising its authority on tribe-owned land. 131
According to the Court, the sovereignty of tribes has virtually evapo-
rated, giving way to more state regulation within the reservations'
borders.132 The greater the state's interest in a matter that has occurred on
123. Id. The Court in Montana determined that when tribes enter into consensual
relationships, such as leases, contracts, commercial transactions, or "other arrangements" with
nonmembers, the tribe may regulate such activities. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
124. Hicks 111, 533 U.S. at 359 n.3.
125. Id. at 359-60.
126. Id. The Court did not elaborate on what other factors need to be taken into
consideration when deciding whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over a nonmember. Id.
127. Id. The Court has seldom upheld tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on land not
owned by the tribe. Id. The exception is Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408, 443-44
(1989), where the Court allowed the tribe to regulate zoning on land that was not tribally owned
and closed to the general public. Id. at 360.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 361.
130. Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). Where Congress is silent,
courts must look at the state's infringement on the right of the tribe to make its own laws, when
there is a conflict among state and tribal court jurisdiction over a matter involving both tribal
members and nonmembers. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832), Chief Justice Marshall stated
that the laws of the state have no force within reservation boundaries. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561;
see also Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks 111), 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001). However, this view has given
way to the idea that reservations are now considered part of the state and no longer sovereign
entities. Hicks Il1, 533 U.S. at 361-62.
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reservation land, the greater degree of regulatory authority the state can
exercise, even over tribal members. 33 However, when only tribal members
are involved in a matter that has occurred on tribal land, the state has little
or no interest and will usually not get involved.134 The Court concluded
that Nevada had a significant interest in its officials' execution of process
related to the violation of Nevada Revised Statute section 501.376 and that
"even when it relates to Indian-fee lands, it no more impairs the tribe's
self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state
government."135 Absent congressional action revoking the state's inherent
jurisdiction, no federal statute exists that prevents state officials from
entering a reservation for the purposes of investigating or prosecuting state
offenses.136
Even though the Court found that tribal courts generally do not have
jurisdiction over nonmembers, particularly state officials executing process
on tribe-owned land, the Court still addressed the issue of whether a tribal
court has the authority to adjudicate § 1983 claims. 137
2. The Tribal Court Is Not a Court of General Jusrisdiction and
Therefore It Cannot Entertain 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Claims
When determining whether a court has jurisdiction to entertain claims
brought under § 1983, it must first be determined whether the court is a
court of general jurisdiction.138 State courts are courts of general juris-
diction, which allows them to hear cases involving federal statutes and
claims, including § 1983 claims. 139 The Court found that tribal courts are
not courts of general jurisdiction because when it comes to nonmembers, a
tribal court's adjudicative jurisdiction is only as great as its legislative
jurisdiction.140 Congress has provided tribal courts with some authority to
decide certain matters of federal law, but not § 1983 claims.14'
133. Hicks I1, 533 U.S. at 362.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 364-65; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 501.376 (1995).
136. Hicks II, 533 U.S. at 365.
137. Id. at 366.
138. Id. A court of general jurisdiction is a court that can "hear a wide range of cases, civil
or criminal, that arise within its geographic area." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed.
1999).
139. Hicks 111, 533 U.S. at 366. The Court has implied that under Article HI of the United
States Constitution state courts can adjudicate matters involving federal law, and are granted
concurrent jurisdiction over such matters. Id. at 366-67.
140. Id. at 367.
141. Id. at 367-68. Some aspects of federal law can be adjudicated by tribal courts, which
include foreclosures on mortgages against tribal members by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
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The Court also reasoned that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over § 1983
claims because the federal-question removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, does
not provide for removal from tribal court to a federal forum. 142 Under §
1441, a case brought into state court may be removed to federal court, if the
federal court has original jurisdiction.143 The Court claimed that removal
would cause "serious anomalies" because defendants would be unable to
seek a federal forum if they were hailed into tribal court. 144 The Court
concluded that because tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction
and § 1441 does not provide for removal from tribal courts to federal
courts, tribal courts cannot adjudicate § 1983 claims.145
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Souter, along with Justices Kennedy and Thomas, agreed that
the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Hicks's claims.146
However, Justice Souter found that by strictly adhering to the Montana
rule, the Court could have reached the same conclusion without having to
focus primarily on the state's interests in carrying out process. 147 Justice
Souter found that, aside from its exceptions, the Montana rule bars tribal
jurisdiction over all nonmembers, not only state officials, regardless of
whether the incident occurred on tribe-owned land. 4 8
To look at the ownership status of the land on which the incident
occurred as a primary factor in deciding tribal jurisdiction "would produce
an unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt."149 Justice Souter agreed with the
Court that ownership status of the land on which the incident occurred is a
Development and disputes over child custody under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. Id.;
see also 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (2000); 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2000).
142. Hicks I, 533 U.S. at 368; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). The Court held that it
would be easier to find that tribal courts did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate § 1983 claims than
to deal with the removal issue and the problems associated with it. Hicks I11, 533 U.S. at 369.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). Under § 1441, a federal court will have original jurisdiction if
the action arises under the laws and Constitution of the United States, regardless of the citizenship
of the parties. Id. Removal is more difficult when the action does not arise under the laws or
Constitution of the United States, because citizenship or ownership of property in the jurisdiction
becomes a prerequisite for removal. Id. Original jurisdiction is a court's authority to hear an
issue before another court has had the opportunity to review it. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856
(7th ed. 1999).
144. Hicks 111, 533 U.S. at 368. In its brief, the government stated that the lack of reference
to tribal courts in § 1441 was not a problem, claiming that Congress would not try to deny tribal
defendants the same rights as state defendants. Id.
145. Id. at 368-69.
146. Id. at 375 (Souter, J., concurring).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 375-76.
149. Id. at 383.
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factor to be considered when deciding whether a tribal court would have
jurisdiction over a nonmember.150 However, Justice Souter stated that this
factor is only relevant in the application of the Montana exceptions and
should not be a controlling factor, because it would only lead to confusion
due to the ever changing characteristics of tribes and tribal jurisdiction. 151
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
In her brief concurrence, Justice Ginsburg clarified that the Court's
holding applied only to tribal jurisdiction over state officials and left open
the question of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, including state officials
not acting within the scope of employment, on tribe-owned land. 152 Justice
Ginsburg pointed out that the jurisdictional questions posed and left
unanswered in Strate v. A-i Contractors were not answered by the Court's
limited holding. 153
D. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE IN PART AND IN JUDGMENT
Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's holding, stating that it "under-
mine[d] the authority of tribes to 'make their own laws and be ruled by
them."' 154 Justice O'Connor argued that the Court did not follow prior
precedent when it held that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction over the
state game wardens. 155 According to Justice O'Connor, the Court, in apply-
ing the rule set out in Montana, decided for the first time that tribal jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers is lacking, regardless of whether the incident in
question occurred on tribe-owned land.156 Justice O'Connor reasoned that
the Court's opinion and its application of Montana were flawed because it
gave little emphasis to the fact that the incident occurred on tribe-owned
land and focused too much on the fact that the nonmembers were state
officials. 157
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
153. Id. In Strate, the Court had questioned whether tribes would have jurisdiction over
nonmembers on tribe-owned land but did not actually answer the question. Strate v. A-I
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
154. Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks 111), 533 U.S. 353, 387 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 385.
156. Id. at 387.
157. Id. at 391.
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Justice O'Connor argued that the Court gave little reasoning as to why
the exceptions to the Montana rule, namely the "consensual relationship"
exception, did not apply. 58 The Court found that the "consensual relation-
ship" exception applies only to private relationships, which would be
inapplicable in this case.159  Justice O'Connor found that whether a
consensual relationship did exist was questionable; however, the Court
should not have concluded that one could never exist in similar
circumstances.1 60  Justice O'Connor asserted that there is no reason "to
create a per se rule that [would] foreclose future debate as to whether
cooperative agreements, or other forms of official consent, could ever be a
basis for tribal jurisdiction."161
Next, Justice O'Connor examined the Court's treatment of Montana's
second exception, which allows for tribal regulation of nonmember conduct
that threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the eco-
nomic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.162 Justice O'Connor
argued that the Court gave little basis for why the execution of process by a
state officer is not fundamental to a tribe's right to self-governance.163
Justice O'Connor found that tribes retain a great deal of interest in what
occurs on their land and was disturbed by the Court's undermining of that
interest.164 Justice O'Connor was even more troubled by the Court's
disregard of the fact that the state wardens' actions took place on tribe-
owned land, and she concluded that a tribe's interest is paramount under
these circumstances and should not be disregarded just because the
nonmembers in this case happened to be state officials. 65
158. Id. The Court briefly addressed the "consensual relationship" exception in footnote
three of its opinion, which Justice O'Connor found to be inadequate. Id.
159. Id. The Court stated that the Montana Court, by creating the exception for "consensual
relationships," did not intend to include the state or state officials and offered prior precedent,
which dealt only with private individuals, as support for its conclusion. Id. at 372.
160. Id. at 393. The Court, in rebutting Justice O'Connor's concurrence, stated that it did not
find that the "consensual relationship" exception would never be applicable; rather, the language
in Montana does not appear to include under this exception state officers obtaining a warrant from
a tribal court. Id. at 372.
161. Id. at 393.
162. Id.
163. Id. The Court claimed that Justice O'Connor gave very little reasoning and evidentiary
support for why she found that state service of process implicated a tribe's right to self-
governance. Id. at 370.
164. Id.
165. Id. The Court considered the ownership status of the land where the incident occurred,
but it found the state's interest outweighed the fact that tribe-owned land was involved. Id. The
Court concluded that this might not always be the situation. Id.
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Justice O'Connor stated that the case should have been decided based
on the state game wardens' claims of immunity.166 According to Justice
O'Connor, any claims of immunity should be addressed by a court as soon
as possible to avoid any unnecessary litigation.167 Because the court of
appeals failed to do this, Justice O'Connor argued that the case should have
been reversed and remanded to determine if there was tribal jurisdiction
under the Montana rule.168
E. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court that tribal
courts could not entertain § 1983 claims. 169 Instead, he concluded that
tribal courts should be able to do so unless enjoined by a federal court. 170
Justice Stevens argued that when there is no federal law stating otherwise,
"the question whether tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction is
fundamentally one of tribal law."171 When a tribal court has jurisdiction
over the parties, it should not be denied the ability to adjudicate their §
1983 claims. 172 Justice Stevens did not find it troublesome that § 1983 is
silent regarding tribal courts and their ability to adjudicate such claims,
primarily because it is also silent in regards to state courts which are
allowed to adjudicate § 1983 claims.174
IV. IMPACT
The United States is home to approximately 560 federally recognized
tribes and 262 tribal courts. 175 As a result of United States Supreme Court
decisions regarding tribal jurisdiction in the last thirty years, tribal courts
166. Id. at 398. "The doctrines of official immunity and qualified immunity are designed to
protect state and federal officials from civil liability for conduct that was within the scope of their
duties or conduct that did not violate clearly established law." Id. (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 400.
168. Id. at 399-400. The Court criticized Justice O'Connor's concurrence by stating that she
"manages to have [her] cake and eat it too-to hand over state law-enforcement officers to the
jurisdiction of tribal courts and yet still assure that the officers' traditional immunity... will be
protected." Id. at 373.
169. Id. at 400 (Stevens, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 402.
171. Id. (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981) (finding
that the question of state subject matter jurisdiction is guided by state law)).
172. Id. at 403.
174. Id. at 403-04.
175. John Gibeaut, Native Americans and the Law: Courting Trouble, 86 A.B.A. J. 68, 68
(Mar. 2000).
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have lost most of their sovereignty as well as financial support. 176 By limit-
ing the amount of money allocated to tribal courts, the federal government
appears to be following the same trend of divestiture taken by the Court. 177
This has left many tribal courts struggling with heavy caseloads and little
money. 178
Tribes have expressed concern that the Court's recent decisions will
lead to "judicial termination," as well as make tribal governments power-
less to defend the cultural identities of tribal communities. 179 As a result,
several tribal leaders and their representatives gathered in Washington,
D.C., to discuss possible legislation that would help restore tribal
sovereignty and jurisdiction.1 80 Some propose that an amendment be made
to 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which would allow for tribal jurisdiction over inci-
dents that occur on and off the reservation.1 81 Other proposed legislation
includes the restoration of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, the
recognition by Congress of the authority of tribes to regulate and tax, and
federal funding for a Federal Indian appeals court. 182
In addition to proposing legislation, the group of leaders that met in
Washington, D.C., sought to establish the "Tribal Sovereignty Protection
Initiative," which has six main objectives.183 These objectives include the
176. Id. at 68-69. Tribal courts receive very little federal funding in contrast to state and
federal courts. Id. at 69. Congress tried to cure this discrepancy by passing the Tribal Justice Act
of 1993; however, the Act has never been enforced and no money has been appropriated under it.
Id.
177. Id. Tribal courts receive approximately $11 million a year from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and have recently received additional federal funds of $5 million from the Judicial
Department. Id.
178. Id. In 1998, the courts of the Navajo Nation heard over 27,600 criminal cases. Id.
With the increase in crime on reservations, tribes have had to increase spending to hire additional
police officers and build jails, which have taken away funding for tribal courts. Id. In the last two
years, $172 million has been spent to improve tribal criminal justice systems across the nation. Id.
179. See generally As NCAI Annual Session Enters Final Day, Officers are Elected and
Business Goes On, Alliance of California Tribes, available at http://pechanga.net/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2002); Issues, Cabazon Tribe, available at http://www.cabazonindians.conissues.htmi
(last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
180. Brian Stockes, Tribal Leaders Discuss Jurisdiction as Pentagon Attacked, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 14, 2001, at Al.
181. Brenda Norrell, American Indian Leaders Plan Defense Strategies: Supreme Court
Attacks Sovereignty, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 2, 2001, available at http:/www.
indiancountry.com/?1787 (last visited Mar. 15, 2002). Tribal leaders hope to push this and other
legislation through by 2002-2003. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
182. Carolyn Calvin, Navajo Council Approves Policy Position "On Court's Diminishment
of Sovereignty, " NAIIP NEWS PATH, Aug. 31, 2001, available at http://www.the PeoplesPath.com.
net/News200l/OlO8/Navajo00831Policy.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002). In addition to pro-
posing legislation, tribal leaders are calling for tribes to unite and defend their "inherent sovereign
rights." Id.
183. Tribal Leaders Forum: A Strategic Plan to Stop the Supreme Court's Erosion of
Tribal Sovereignty, available at http://www.ncai.orglmainlpages/issueslgovemance/documents/
Sept I ISummary.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
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development of legislation to reestablish tribal jurisdiction, the formation of
a project that will "support and coordinate tribal advocacy before the
Supreme Court," and the promotion of ideas that will assist tribal govern-
ments in protecting tribal jurisdiction.184 Also included are the increase of
"tribal participation in the selection of federal judiciary," the development
of media and other means of making the public and Congress aware of
tribal governance and the promotion of the Initiative, and the implemen-
tation of fundraising for various organizations, as well as the Initiative.185
The overall goal of the Initiative is to pass a "comprehensive bill to protect
[t]ribal sovereignty."186
North Dakota has four Native American tribal courts, which are
located in Fort Yates, Fort Totten, Belcourt, and New Town. 187 Because
these courts are governed by Hicks III, as well as other holdings regarding
tribal jurisdiction, they will share in and experience repercussions similar to
other tribal courts throughout the nation. 188
According to David Getches, an Indian law scholar, "[u]nless and until
Indian law is again understood by the Court to be a distinct field, with its
own doctrines and traditions rooted in the nation's history and Constitution,
it is likely that Indian policy will unravel further."189 As a result, the
interests of Indians will suffer and there will be mass confusion as to the
law that will govern conflicts and controversies arising between tribes and
non-Indian parties. 190
V. CONCLUSION
In Hicks III, the Court held for the first time that tribal courts do not
have jurisdiction over a state official's conduct on tribe-owned land and
that state authority does not stop at a reservation's borders.191 The Court
184. Id.
185. Id. These organizations include the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI)
and the Native American Rights Fund (NARF). Id.
186. Id.
187. See B.J. Jones, A Primer on Tribal Court Civil Practice, THE GAVEL, Aug.-Sept. 1998,
12, 14 n.l, available at http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/ResourcefTribal.htm. The Standing
Rock Sioux Tribal Court and its appellate court can be found in Fort Yates. Id. The Spirit Lake
Tribal Court is located in Fort Totten, while the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Tribal Court
and its independent appellate court are located in Belcourt. Id. The Fort Berthold District Court
of the Three Affiliated Tribes is located in New Town. Id.
188. See Tony Mauro, O'Connor, Breyer Go West, Get an Earful on Indian Rulings, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at A10.
189. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 361 (2001).
190. Id.
191. Nevada v. Hicks (Hicks 111), 533 U.S. 353, 361-66 (2001).
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noted that the ownership status of land is only one factor to consider in
determining whether a tribal court will have jurisdiction over a non-
member. 92 In addition, the Court held that tribal courts are not courts of
general jurisdiction, and therefore, they cannot entertain § 1983 claims.193
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